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Central Banks are often accused of being 
obsessed with inflation. This is untrue. If they are 
obsessed with anything, it is with fiscal policy. 
(Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England) 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the robustness of the theory that claims 
restrictive effects of expansionary fiscal policy. It shows that such so-
called “non-Keynesian effects” may arise from synchronous and opposite 
monetary policy interventions. The paper demonstrates this conclusion 
through a stylized model – supported by an empirical investigation on 
ECB and FED reaction functions – in which Central Banks consider 
deficit spending as an element that generates inflation expectations. 
Econometric analysis also shows that the ECB reacts asymmetrically to 
deficit spending variations while the FED has a linear reaction to this 
indicator. 
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1. The Background 
 
Theoretical settings of fiscal policy have changed dramatically since the early 1990s in comparison 
with the previous decades. Previously, public deficit was considered strictly a tool for stabilization of 
aggregate demand and income. Subsequently, such an instrumental role was increasingly criticized. 
The final outcome of this theoretical reconsideration is a new conventional wisdom that connects 
counter-intuitive effects to public deficit spending.  
This paper  evaluates the theoretical robustness of this new orthodoxy that has become a ruling 
paradigm and a very popular conjecture in mainstream economic thought. New theoretical 
foundations appear in two mirror approaches, thought of as perfectly equivalent: “Keynesian effects 
of non-Keynesian fiscal policy”, and “non-Keynesian effects of Keynesian fiscal policy”. 
The former refers to the hypothesis that a fiscal contraction could give rise to positive effects on 
production and income, a phenomenon now labelled as Keynesian effects of non-Keynesian fiscal 
policy; the latter, usually thought similar to the former, holds that an increase in public deficit 
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spending may create negative quantity effects on production and income, according to a theory of 
non-Keynesian effects of Keynesian fiscal policy. 
Although the two phenomena differ in theoretical terms,  irrespective of superficial equivalence, the 
common starting point of such conventional wisdom is the failure of the “old-fashioned” Keynesian 
belief in a positive fiscal multiplier. 
The struggle against this model is no recent phenomenon. There have been opponents to basic 
Keynesianism since the first pioneering exposition of a positive fiscal multiplier made by Keynes in 
the late 1920s through argumentations included in the Treasury View1. This disagreement resurfaced 
in the late 1960s with the Friedman monetarist approach to the natural rate of unemployment 
approach, and it continued with the “crowding-out” argumentations arriving at Rational Expectations 
Models and Ricardian equivalence. 
It must be stressed that all these positions theorized a low or null fiscal multiplier whereas new 
positions in the early 1990s assumed negative fiscal multipliers, that is non-Keynesian effects of 
Keynesian fiscal policies and vice versa. 
The germinal work of the new approach was provided by Giavazzi and Pagano in 19902, leading to 
an uninterrupted flow of contributions, with new research by old pioneers, now supported by new 
scholars.3 Such contributions have to be analysed very carefully because they constitute a constant 
benchmark for all subsequent studies on the negative effects of fiscal policy and because new 
conventional positions of policy-makers, particularly within the Euro Area, refer constantly and 
explicitly to the Giavazzi and Pagano position. 
Our paper offers a different view with respect to the interpretative hypotheses of the non-Keynesian 
view (hereafter NKV). We shall seek to argue that:   
i. Keynesian effects are produced by a peculiar policy mix (well-known in the 1980s) 
determined by an essential role played by monetary and exchange rate policies and not 
by “pure non-Keynesian fiscal policies”; 
ii. Possible success of “intrinsic pure non-Keynesian fiscal policies” depends on very severe 
and unreal analytical conditions; 
iii. European policy-makers, namely the European Central Bank and the European 
Committee, have embraced such a theoretical approach without exploring all its limits. 
In this paper we try to develop this alternative approach using the following structure. Section 2 
analyzes the main theoretical foundations of the non-Keynesian view. In section 3, we review the 
empirical literature of the NKV approach. In section 4 we comment on the framework conditions 
that usually help NK policies to reach counter-intuitive results. In section 5 a model containing the 
fiscal policy transmission mechanisms is presented in its structural relations. Through this model we 
derive the validity condition of NKV outcomes and show the relevance of monetary policy 
cooperation in order to reach these results. In section 6 we empirically ascertain the consistency of 
our conjectures, particularly the relevance of the monetary framework. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
 
2. The Tale  of a  Fiscal Counter-Revolution 
 
During the 1980s the growing budget deficit and very high public debt triggered a profound review 
of the direct relation between public expenditure and growth. Academics agreed that there was the 
need to consolidate public finances due to the instability effects of real, monetary and financial 
markets. The institutional claims coming from the ongoing EMU lent further impetus to this stream 
of studies. 
                                                 
1 Peden G.C., 1984 
2 Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990. 
3 Giavazzi et al, 1999, 2000 and 2005. 
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However, even if economists agreed on the negative effects on growth of increasing fiscal 
imbalances, at the same time they feared the negative results of fiscal restrictions. Therefore, when 
they started to observe successful fiscal consolidations – i.e. the contemporary presence of budget 
deficit reductions and income growth – they concluded that there was no doubt left as to which 
economic policy to pursue.  
The work considered the most important for the subject was that by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), a 
very successful econometric analysis in which the authors observed a consumption increase during 
fiscal restriction. It paved the way to the general conclusion – or, as they call it, to the non-
conventional wisdom - that retrenchments can be expansionary. This is what we call the non-
Keynesian view. 
Following this first publication, Giavazzi and Pagano (1995) extended the results of fiscal 
consolidations to fiscal expansions4. They found that “fiscal policy changes can have non-Keynesian 
effects if they are sufficiently large and persistent”5. These results were further consolidated in 
Giavazzi et al. (1999), (2000) and (2005), where they estimated the saving function instead of the 
consumption one. 
The theoretical foundations of their empirical results are based on a composition of Modigliani life-
cycle theory or Friedman permanent income theory and Ricardian-equivalence theory as in Barro 
(1974). If consumers a) have rational expectations and b) are not liquidity-constrained, they tend to 
smooth consumption – or saving - through time, following the expected flow of actualized 
disposable income. If therefore during fiscal retrenchment we observe an increase in consumption, it 
is proof that private individuals have revised their permanent income upward and that – the authors 
state – the cause of this revision is the consolidation of public finances. 
On further investigation, progressive consolidation of their non-Keynesian view emerges. In 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) the positive effects on consumption were observable because of “two 
simultaneous policy shocks: a fall in current disposable income, due to the increase in current taxes, 
and a wealth effect due to an unanticipated fall in nominal and real interest rates”6. They admit that 
the expansionary effect is not the result of a pure fiscal restriction but of its indirect effect on interest 
rates. In Giavazzi and Pagano (1995) the observed negative effect on income of fiscal expansions is 
caused - in their view - by the downward revision of private individuals’ permanent income. It is 
considered certain that the reduction in permanent income is univocally determined by expansionary 
fiscal policy. 
The stream of studies has been so successful that they have continued to extend and reinforce their 
conclusions through testing the saving function. Giavazzi et al.  (1999), (2000) and (2005) differ 
from each other in the width of the sample considered. Using econometric analysis they conclude 
that: 
a) national saving non-linearly increases or decreases when there is fiscal consolidation and 
contraction, respectively;  
b) non-linearity arises since fiscal episodes are not sufficiently large and persistent as predicted by 
the theory of permanent income;  
c) fiscal consolidations are more effective than fiscal expansions;  
d) variation in net taxes are more effective than variations in public consumption; 
e) finally, the level of public debt is not a good predictor of non-Keynesian effects. 
In brief, while at the beginning the core of their NKV was the fiscal and monetary policy mix, 
through the years, it has become  pure fiscal policy. The opposite effect of fiscal interventions is 
assured by a kind of “super-Barro effect” according to which fiscal contraction or expansion does 
                                                 
4 Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal restrictions are very often estimated, while the opposite has not found broad consensus 
in the empirical literature.  
5 Giavazzi Pagano’s (1995) abstract. The first but not the second use of italics is ours. 
6 Giavazzi Pagano (1990), p. 14 
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not have a null outcome, but a more than proportional autonomous negative effect on permanent 
income7. 
This last position has limits that cannot be easily overcome: non-Keynesian effects of Keynesian 
policies cannot derive simply from the relation between fiscal stance and saving or consumption8. In 
order to make them occur it must be supposed – beside the hypotheses of rational expectations and 
no-liquidity constraint - that the fiscal policy intervention: a) is unanticipated, otherwise individuals 
would have already discounted the disposable income change and b) has positive effects on the real 
value of private assets or c) is financed through debt because this predicts a further tax movement in 
order to pay interests on public bonds or d) causes interest rate movements in the same direction. In 
all these cases the fiscal policy causes the opposite movement of income through the channels of the 
consolidated theory – in other words through the change in the rate of interest, real or nominal, 
actual or expected. 
The literature which followed this approach investigated empirically the non-Keynesian results of 
fiscal policies, in particular of fiscal restrictions. The results were found to operate through the 
general effects on reserve wage and competitiveness (Alesina and Perotti 1995 and 1997), but only if 
fiscal consolidations were conducted without raising taxes or cutting public investments (Alesina 
and Perotti 1995, 1997, Alesina and Ardagna 1998). The effects on other components of aggregate 
demand were also investigated, especially the investment channel9. The following factors are 
considered important: the initial level of debt, the persistency of reduction and the dynamic of 
interest rates (Blanchard and Perotti 1999, and Ardagna 2004). Unlike the Giavazzi-Pagano-Jappelli 
contributions this “non-Keynesian literature” relies on the indirect effects of the reduction or 
expansion of public spending on supply and demand without identifying an autonomous capacity of 
increasing or reducing permanent income. 
It is therefore an empirical re-proposition of an old debate about the crowding-out effects of 
expansionary fiscal policies. 
 
 
 
3.  Methodologies of  the  Fiscal Counter-Revolution 
 
The empirical literature about NK effects of fiscal policy can be divided in three main categories 
based on different approaches. The first approach is based on simulations of macroeconomic models. 
The second approach uses cross-section and panel analysis in order to  analyze the relationships 
between fiscal policy and output. These contributions estimate  the reaction of  consumption  interest 
rates, exchange rates and investments to fiscal policies. The third approach is the VAR one.  
                                                 
7 Finite horizon models suggest that an increase in net taxes should raise national saving (>0), whereas an increase in 
government consumption should reduce it. In the benchmark infinite horizon model with lump-sum taxes, taxes have no 
effect on national saving: this is the Ricardian equivalence proposition. Also, in the infinite horizon model, for a given 
path of pre-tax income, Y, government consumption does not affect national saving either. [] But in the regression 
they find that “the coefficient of T/Y* is positive and statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level in each 
regression. [And ] the coefficient of G/Y* is negative and also statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level in 
both regressions. [Therefore] contrary to the predictions of infinite horizon models with non-distortionary taxes, the fall 
in private consumption does not fully compensate the increase in government consumption, thereby reducing national 
saving Giavazzi et al. (2005) p.15. 
8 This circumstance is recognized by the same authors: “Expansionary fiscal contractions can be explained by the effects 
of fiscal policy on the market value of wealth and on expectations about future taxes. A fiscal contraction often reduces 
interest rates, raising the market value of stocks, bonds and real estate, thus stimulating aggregate demand. It can also 
drastically change people’s view of the future and therefore the estimate of their human capital. For instance, in a high-
debt country a fiscal correction may prevent a financial crisis, thus improving confidence and increasing consumption 
and investment” Gavazzi et al. (1998) p.1, (1999) p.2, (2000) p. 2. 
9 Perotti (2004b) “In fact, government investment appears to crowd out private investment, specially in dwelling and in 
machinery and equipment. ” 
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3.1 Behavioural  Equations Estimates   
 
Beginning with Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) a large number of empirical studies has reached the 
conclusion that contractionary (expansionary) fiscal policies may have positive (negative) effects on 
households consumption. These studies analyze fiscal consolidation episodes through the effects on 
behavioural functions. All studies try to isolate the channels through which fiscal contractions may 
have positive effects on output. This literature has focused mainly on consumption, although there 
are some studies analyzing the effects of fiscal policy on investments and interest rates.  
These studies are based on some strong theoretical assumptions. Most households make inter-
temporal optimizations in order to decide their current consumption level, and they have no-liquidity 
constraints. 
The strongest evidence for expansionary fiscal contractions is in Giavazzi and Pagano (1990); the 
authors find that Denmark in 1983-86 and Ireland in 1987-89 are clear examples of non-Keynesian 
effects of fiscal policies. 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1995) try to extend their previous results and to evaluate whether the 
coefficients change in different situations. Non-Keynesian effects seem to occur in adjustment 
periods. The authors find that the effects on private consumption of taxes is 0.05, the coefficient for 
transfers is -0.07, while the effect of public consumption is -0.02. In normal times the behaviour of 
consumption seems to be purely Keynesian. Thus, it seems difficult to conclude that such small 
coefficients in the consumption reaction to fiscal policies could result in expansionary effects of 
fiscal contractions.    
Giavazzi et al (2000) conclude that large fiscal policies have stronger effects10. They analyze 
consumption, estimating a saving behavioural function and making a distinction between bad and 
good times. The results do not seem to give evidence for non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policies 
even in bad times. 
Hjelm (2002) tries to extend the conclusion drawn for Ireland and Denmark in Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1990), while Kamps (2001) seeks to do the same for the results in Giavazzi et al. (2000). Kamps 
(2001) finds no NK effects, except in three cases with country-specific consumption equations. 
Nevertheless, the author admits that a richer specification is needed in order to make the results less 
fragile.  
Hjelm (2002) analyzes a panel of 19 countries spanning the period 1970-97. Estimation of the share 
of consumers that are credit constrained shows low levels, ranging from 0.1 to 0.14. Surprisingly, the 
impact of fiscal policy on consumption is not negative, and sometimes barely positive.  
It seems that this kind of analysis has some limits that prevent it from being completely convincing. 
Since most of these studies focus on some episodes of fiscal contractions, it seems that a sample 
selection bias may arise. Hemming et al. (2002) suggest that handpicking specific country-cases 
could provide stronger results with respect to a larger cross-section of countries.  
Measurement errors can also occur since most such papers use fiscal deficits as a basis for assessing 
fiscal policy change, but deficit is just one of the elements determining the effects of a fiscal policy.  
A richer specification could have given different results. Other variables could explain the 
relationship between fiscal policy and economic activity (e.g. inflation, exchange rates, 
unemployment rates, wealth effect and interest rates). 
Another problem, is the absence of a variable (or a set of variables) controlling for the interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policy. Ahrend et al. (2006) assess how and in what circumstances 
fiscal consolidations are affected by the choices of monetary policy. Surprisingly, there are not so 
many papers studying the effects of monetary policy and/or exchange rate variations on a 
consolidation policy. Fiscal consolidation can be assisted by a shift in monetary stance since a 
                                                 
10 The same conclusion is reached by Gavazzi and Pagano (1995) and Cour et al (1996). 
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decrease in the interest rates can compensate the depressive effect of fiscal contraction on the 
demand. On the other hand, a monetary expansion can reduce interest payments on public debt.  
Ahrend et al. (2006) conclude that the reaction of the central bank can be very important in 
determining the results of a fiscal consolidation. These results seem to have a very strong theoretical 
implication. Fiscal plans have to be implemented in the central bank projections and the response of 
the central bank should influence the result of a fiscal policy. 
 
 
3.2 Macroeconomic Model Simulations  
 
Estimates from simulations of macroeconomic models do not give unique results about fiscal 
multipliers. Nevertheless, given its technical complexity, this approach permits us to specify some 
aspects that are not taken into account with other methods. One of these concerns the specification of 
the reaction in terms of monetary policy. Nevertheless, this literature has some common features, 
one of them being that most of the analyses show that short-term multipliers are positive.  
Richardson (1998) uses the INTERLINK model in order to analyze some short- and long-run 
macroeconomic aspects. The author investigates the response in terms of output from an increase in 
public expenditure. The experiment evidences positive multipliers that decrease over time. 
Moreover, different assumptions about the reactions in terms of monetary policy show different 
results. Nevertheless, the incidence of different monetary regimes seems to have relevance only in 
the short run (Dalsgaard et al., 2001 and IMF, 1996). 
Further clear evidence is that the range of multipliers estimated is narrower in the long run 
(McKibbin, 1996 and Bryant et al., 1993). As evidenced in Roeger and in’t Velt (2002) and Barrel et 
al. (2002), the multipliers constantly reduce over time and reach zero in the long run. Hunt and 
Laxton (2002), and Dalsgaard et al. (2001) find negative long-run multipliers for the same group of 
countries using INTERLINK and MULTIMOD models. 
Many macro model simulations show that in the short run spending changes multipliers are bigger 
than tax changes. A MULTIMOD model simulation in IMF (1996) shows that for the USA the 
spending multiplier is 1.1 and the tax multiplier is 0.7. 
It seems clear that the specification of the models and their assumptions are crucial in determining 
different results. Wallis (2003) makes a comparison of the QUEST, NiGEM, MULTIMOD and 
AWM models, and finds that all short-run multipliers are positive.  
The main difference between the models seems to be the specification of the consumption function. 
In AWM the consumption function is based on present income. In the simulations of the NIGEM 
model, consumption is not a function of temporary income changes and consumers are completely 
backward-looking. MULTIMOD models consider liquidity constraints, and these levels change with 
different specifications of the model. 
To conclude, there is evidence that public expenditure cuts reduce output. Nevertheless, estimates of 
future incomes and how they are used for the forecasts, estimates of consumption, the predictability 
level of the economy by the agents are all points that are sometimes not stressed and explained in 
exhaustively. 
 
 
3.3 VAR Approach  Literature  
 
The time series-based empirical literature studying the effects of fiscal policy shocks mainly uses 
VAR models to represent the economy. The main differences among all these studies concern the 
VAR specification and shock identification strategies. 
Fatas and Mihov (2001 a, b) solve the identification problem using the recursive approach (based on 
the Cholesky decomposition) introduced by Sims (1980). Fatas and Mihov (2001 a) show that an 
increase in government expenditure is coupled with an increase in private consumption and 
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employment. Although the results are in line with the Keynesian theory, the spending multiplier 
values are small.  
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) show that an increase in public expenditure is followed by an increase 
in output, and that an increase in taxes is followed by a reduction in output. Moreover, the long-run 
multiplier still remains positive and close to unity.  
The Blanchard and Perotti (2002) approach has been widely used: Kuttner and Posen (2002) find a 
spending multiplier of 2.0 and a tax multiplier of 2.5 for Japan. Perotti (2002) analyzes a sample 
containing five countries, and finds that impact and peak spending multipliers are always positive, 
although the peaks are reached in different periods ranging from one quarter (Germany) to 17 (UK 
and Canada). The evidence for the sign of long-run multipliers is more mixed, depending on the sub-
samples considered. Nevertheless, the above article suffers from some statistical weaknesses since 
some series are non-stationary and the trend correction could have been insufficient to correct it.   
Mountford and Uhlig (2002) use a different approach imposing sign restrictions directly on the 
impulse-response functions. They analyze USA data and they find that shocks to government 
expenditure are substitutes for private investment rather than private consumption, since the latter is 
not reduced after an increase in government spending. Moreover, they argue that the fiscal policy 
reacts to cycles but does not to monetary policy. 
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) introduce the fiscal dummy variable approach, also known as the 
narrative approach, in order to analyze the effects of large military spending in the USA. Their idea 
is to consider defence spending as a proxy for government expenditure. They conclude that 
consumption falls after an increase in military spending while the increase in GDP is not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, other fiscal shocks could have occurred in the same period, polluting 
the identification of the military expenditure shock. 
As already evidenced, all these papers differ in the VAR specification and in the identification of the 
fiscal shock. It can be argued that the different results of such studies may be due to specification 
and identification choices. Caldara and Kamps (2006) test whether such differences can explain the 
different results. All the implemented approaches agree in showing a positive reaction of GDP to a 
positive government shock. They conclude that, with appropriate VAR specification, the recursive 
and Blanchard-Perotti identification schemes have only minor differences in their impulse-response 
functions. 
VAR literature shows that there is a positive relationship between government expenditure and 
output and that the multiplier is not negative even in the long run. The results concerning the 
relationship between government expenditure and consumption are more controversial. 
Nevertheless, even in papers where consumption decreases after a positive shock in public 
expenditure the fiscal multiplier is positive. It must therefore be incorrect to conclude from a 
negative relationship between consumption and fiscal policy that the latter has negative effects on 
output.  
 
 
Apart from the theoretical robustness of contributions, as well as their shortcomings, the NKV 
context shows the following features: 
 
i) it aims at undermining the positive value of the Keynesian fiscal multiplier; 
ii) the Ricardian Equivalence Approach becomes a practical tool to propose radical  
departures in policy-making: Fiscal retrenchment cannot be further considered as a cause of 
recession; 
iii) the model key variable is private consumption (or saving). Keynesian effects of non-
Keynesian fiscal policies are supposed to arise through private consumption variations, 
whereas in the Keynesian approach the adjustment burden is borne by investment. 
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iv) In a single step, the NKV dismisses arguments on Keynesian fiscal policies, even 
those pertaining to the struggle, in the late 1920s, between Keynes and the so-called 
“Treasury View”11. 
The NKV approach has benefited from broad academic and “policy” acceptance, which is hard to 
understand from a purely theoretical point of view.  
There were few doubtful economists: undoubtedly Blinder (2004), Fitoussi (2002, 2004 and 2005), 
Solow (2005) and Krugmann (2005), partly Wyplosz (2005 and 2006), and not one younger scholar. 
The result was a huge effort in econometric technicalities aimed at strengthening the empirical 
consistency of the NKV approach, without considering its theoretical coherence. 
 
 
 
4. The Theoretical Coherence of the Fiscal Counter Revolution: Ceteris are not Always 
Paribus. 
 
A major shortcoming of the IS-LM approach was neglect of the public budget constraint and, hence, 
of the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policy; similarly, the NKV fails to consider 
monetary effects of fiscal stance variations. The Central Bank, following a fiscal shock, can decide 
three different behaviours: neutral feedback, when the Central Bank determines its instrumental 
variable and intermediate targets irrespective of fiscal policy; an antagonist approach, when it 
operates on its instrumental variables aiming at frustrating decisions taken by the fiscal authority); a 
cooperative stance, when monetary policy cooperates to achieve targets by means of public deficit 
variations (Allsopp and Vines 2005, Allsopp 2002). 
The monetary policy instrument for a central bank is the interest rate (Romer 2000 and 2006). It can 
be assessed without its intermediate and final targets being defined. The interest rate is determined 
by the reaction function of the central bank. Thus it follows that: 
i. complete evaluation of fiscal policy effects that are assumed by the NKV should also 
consider the effects determined by interest rate variations decided by the central bank in 
response to a new fiscal policy setting; 
ii. consideration of the effects of interest rate changes would permit a distinction between pure 
policies (in the sense of policies without any monetary feedback) or policies brought about in 
the presence of co-operative or antagonistic central bank behaviour; 
iii the validity of the NKV (that is, the presence of Keynesian effects with non-Keynesian 
fiscal policies, or non-Keynesian effects through Keynesian fiscal policies) depends on the 
assumption of the presence of pure fiscal policies. Otherwise we should start from a monetary 
and fiscal policy mix. 
On analyzing the first NKV paper (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990), it seems clear that episodes of fiscal 
policy retrenchments that are considered to have caused non-Keynesian effects are actually policy 
mix episodes, in which monetary and currency policies have played a crucial role: “…reviewing the 
key facts about the Danish and Irish experiments, highlighting the importance of the monetary and 
exchange rate policies that accompanied the fiscal stabilisation”(p.6); “cuts in spending and tax 
increases were accompanied ….by complementary monetary and exchange rate policies”(p.7); “the 
removal of controls on capital inflows by Danish authorities was equivalent to a positive demand 
shock”(p.27);..we also found that part of the expansionary effects of the fiscal contractions analyzed 
here must be attributed to the concomitant monetary disinflation….it is remarkable that in both our 
cases of “expansionary contractions” the shift in fiscal and exchange rate policy was preceded by a 
sizable devaluation”(p.28)12.  
                                                 
11 Keynes proposed a program of public works financed by government bonds in the electoral program of Lloyd George. 
The Treasury, a British institution “more than a ministry” (Peden), disagreed, because it assumed both negative effects 
due to dis-saving created by the public sector, and inefficiencies in government expenditure. 
12 Italics added. 
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This approach did not change in subsequent works: fiscal retrenchments are always analysed for 
their apparent features, as if ceteris were paribus and not regarding other phenomena, such as central 
bank reaction on interest and exchange rates.  
But if ceteris are not paribus it is interesting to examine the effects of fiscal policies on monetary 
policy, hence on “the reaction function of central bank” (hereafter CBRF)13. 
Actually, the cases examined by Giavazzi and Pagano, throughout their contributions, are canonical 
examples of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies, where interest and exchange rates 
are affected by public deficit variations. 
The notion that the reaction function of monetary authorities also depends on fiscal policy (Allsopp 
and Vines, 2000) and that the stance of the latter will be, more or less, enhanced by antagonistic or 
co-operative monetary policy reaction function (Taylor, 1996), is not new in the literature. The 
debate on “optimal policy mix”, i.e. on the effectiveness of fiscal contractions harmonized with 
benign monetary policy, goes back to the 1970s and ’80s. The debate in the USA on the optimal 
combination of monetary and fiscal policy in the 1970s and ’80s is fundamental to understanding 
that the theory of economic policy is richer than the debate that originated the NKV (Okun 1972, 
Carlson 1982, Tobin 1982, Blinder 1985)14.  
Understanding policy interdependence and the reaction of the central bank to public deficit 
variations involves analysis of the monetary authorities’ loss function, that is, the behavioural 
equation underlying the reduced form equation of the Taylor Rule, since a rigorous Taylor Rule must 
be derived explicitly from the central bank model of the economy and from the weights attached to 
the possible deviations from the selected targets. We therefore assume that the reaction function of 
the central bank becomes a cornerstone to analyse the effects, whether Keynesian or non-Keynesian, 
of fiscal policies. 
The starting point is the awareness that, empirically speaking, fiscal policy results are strictly 
influenced by monetary policy behaviour. Ahrend et al. (2006) investigate this relationship by 
considering episodes of fiscal consolidation in 24 OECD countries15. The main findings, for our 
aims, can be summarized as follows: 
i. Consolidation is more likely to be successful if, ceteris paribus, it is coupled with an easing 
of monetary policy, especially in the early stage of policy implementation. In addition, it 
seems more likely to be successful when the monetary policy reacts to a greater extent than 
that predicted by a Taylor rule; 
ii. Consolidation has a higher probability of succeeding when interest rates are falling. The 
interest rate variable does not affect the fact  that a consolidation period is started, but 
declining nominal and real short-term interest rates are associated with a higher likelihood 
that the adjustment is pursued, and with greater success. The most convincing explanation for 
this result is that falling interest rates can encourage the continuation of consolidation, 
because the interest rate variable is picking up a reaction of monetary authorities. 
More generally, monetary authorities seem to adopt asymmetric behaviour in the presence of fiscal 
stance changes16. 
Fiscal retrenchment is, usually, encouraged by the central bank: in such a case, the non-Keynesian 
fiscal policy is “helped” by interest and exchange rate policies that give rise to Keynesian effects: “If 
the central bank continues to follow its previous interest rate policy in the face of decline in the long-
run real interest rate, then it will set an interest rate which is too high; this will have the effect of 
reducing demand in the economy (Taylor, 1995). ”To the extent that fiscal plans are expected to be 
implemented, they can normally be expected to be factored into central banks’ macroeconomic 
                                                 
13 Meyer (2000) explicitly stresses the effects of public surplus on the formulation and conduct of monetary policy.  
14 “ To achieve a solid recovery, we need a easier monetary policy combined with a tighter fiscal policy.” (Tobin, 1982). 
15 An episode of fiscal consolidation is identified as starting when CAPB increases by 1% of GDP in no more than two 
years. Short term interest rates are used as a proxy for monetary stance (Ahrend et al., 2006). 
16 Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, is completely aware of the relevance of the fiscal stance on central 
banker behaviour. See King (2005 and 2007). 
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projections” (Ahrend et al. 2006)17. By contrast, fiscal expansion is feared by monetary authorities: 
in such a case, exchange rate appreciation and increased interest rates can frustrate fiscal Keynesian 
policy: “The fiscal authority attempts to lower unemployment by rising the deficit; this is countered 
as monetary authority raises interest rates to fight inflation; and so forth. At the end of this struggle, 
because the two parties pursue different objectives, the surplus is the big loser” (Nordhaus, 1996) 
The key variable to produce asymmetries in the central bank reaction function, and particularly for 
the European Central Bank, is given by the central role that inflation and inflation expectations play 
in determining the monetary authority’s setting of interest rates. Fiscal policies consistent with a 
downgrading of inflation expectations determine a co-operative stance by the Central Bank, whereas 
an increase in public deficit perceived as inconsistent with the stability of inflation expectations is 
worrying and potentially combated by monetary authorities. Building on this evaluation we will 
present, in the next section, a simplified model of income determination, taking into account NKV 
assumptions of “super-Barro effects” of public retrenchment in the consumption function, the role of 
monetary policy decisions on interest and exchange rates, variables which are affected by a peculiar 
reaction function, and are asymmetrically influenced by the supposed consequences of public deficit 
movements on inflation expectations (Surico, 2003).  
 
 
5. Modelling the Role of “Ceteris not Paribus” 
 
We may now present a simple model of income determination, shifting from theoretical evaluations 
under the NKV, augmented with some inclusions we consider crucial: changes in fiscal stance 
proceed necessarily with interest rate variations produced, through its reaction function, by effects 
that monetary authorities think public deficit will cause on market inflation expectations. 
Our model is therefore built on the basis of some key assumptions: the NKV theory of the 
relationship between fiscal policy and permanent income and consumption; the supposed effect of 
public deficit on inflation expectations; the existence of a monetary policy reaction function in which 
inflation expectation alterations play a role.  
We show intentionally a simple exercise of comparative statics, aimed at stressing the main 
structural equations of the model, coming back “to the Neolithic Age of Structural Models” 
(Nordhaus, 1996)18. 
 
 
1 2Y= C + I + D +D  +NX                                                                                               (4.1) 
θ θ+ −0 1C = c (1 ) PY c Y                                                                                                     (4.2) 
αI = - R                                                                                                                               (4.3) 
γ= −P 2Y  B D                                                                                                                      (4.4) 
−0 1NX= n E nY                                                                                                                  (4.5)                              
βπ δ+eR= Y                                                                                                                      (4.6) 
π ν= + +e 1 2
n nA D D                                                                                                            (4.7) 
ξE= - R                                                                                                                                (4.8) 
 
 
 
Equilibrium income is represented in equation (4.1); the only exception with respect to manual 
treatment is given by the splitting of the public deficit into two different components: 1D , a 
                                                 
17 Similar conclusions are reached by Bibow (2004). 
18 Dynamic complication (and/or functions smoothing) should not modify the main results.  
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transitory component that is not considered a component of fiscal stance and 2D , perceived as a 
permanent value of fiscal stance. The consumption function, in equation (4.2), embodies alternative 
scenarios: a traditional Keynesian element, 0c Y , whereby consumption depends on current income 
and NKV, 1 Pc Y , whereby consumption depends on permanent income. The value of θ  reflects the 
social behaviour with reference to private consumption: if 1 θ = , a strict Keynesian approach holds; 
with = 0θ , consumption depends totally on permanent income and, therefore, a NKV scenario 
rules; if 0 1θ≺ ≺ , then private consumers decide, in the very short run, both on disposable and 
permanent income. Investment depends, as in equation (4.3), on the interest rate, while equation 
(4.4) considers the flow of permanent income given by usual factors of “life-cycle” hypothesis, B , 
and the “super-Barro” component derived from the expected permanent reduction in fiscal stance, 
2D . The wealth variation is a condition determined through a subjective parameter, γ . Net exports 
depends, as in equation (4.5), from exchange rate and disposable income19. Equations (4.6)-(4.7)-
(4.8) have to be analyzed together: both components of the public deficit, 1D  and 2D , affect, in 
addition to an exogenous element A , inflation expectations, eπ , according to eq. (4.7). The general 
form of the influence of 1D  and 2D  is included through a generic exponent value, n , that, in the 
case of odd values allows us to suppose a non-linear influence of the public deficit on inflation 
expectations. Inflation expectations, along with a proxy of the output gap, impact on the interest 
rate, through the central bank reaction function20(hereafter CBRF), that, in the very short run, is the 
key variable for influencing the exchange rate, as we assume in eq. (4.8). Assumption of a non-
linear relationship between deficit and inflation expectations and, thus, between the deficit and 
CBRF will prove crucial in discussing the NKV. 
Resolving for eq.(4.1), the equilibrium value of income is: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 2
1 0
1 11 1 1
1 11
n n n nY D n D D D n D c D
k k
Bc A n
k k
βα ξ βα ξ γ ϑ
ϑ βν α ξ
− − − − = − − + − − + − + 
+ − − +      
                 (4.9) 
where 1
k
is the usual multiplier of autonomous aggregate demand: 
0 1 0
1 1
k 1 ( )c n nϑ δ α ξ= − + + +                                                                                              (4.10)  
                                                                                 
Let us consider k  deeply. 
The first three components, 0 11 c nϑ− + , also appear in the Keynesian version of the model, keeping 
in mind the meaning of ϑ . A new different role is played by the CBRF, included in 0( )nδ α ξ+ : if 
income rises there is a balancing effect of the interest rate reaction function of the central bank on 
investment expenditure (αδ ) and through the exchange rate ( 0n ξδ ). From an analytical point of 
view the term 0( )nα ξ δ+ could be thought of as a “negative accelerator” of the Central Bank. 
As an initial step, we can discuss the effects of fiscal policy with assumptions of the NKV and 
without the working of the CBRF. It means the assumption of a fixed interest rate is: 
_
R R= . 
Now the equilibrium income is:  
                                                 
19 It would be necessary, from a strictly theoretical point of view, to include the flow of permanent income, PY , as an 
independent variable affecting NX , in addition to Y . But results are likely to remain unchanged.  
20 Appendix I derives a Central Bank Reaction Function (CBRF) consistent with a structural Loss Function of the 
monetary authority. 
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ϑ γ α ξ
ϑ
= − − − + + +  
− + 1 2 0 1 20 1
1
(1 ) ( ) ( )
1
Y c B D n R D D
c n
                                (4.11) 
Further, if all public deficit is judged as long-lasting and consumption depends completely on 
permanent income, that is if: 
1 0 ; 0D ϑ= =  
the equilibrium value of income is: 
γ α ξ= + − − +  + 1 1 2 01
1
(1 ) ( )
1
Y c B c D n R
n
                                                               (4.12) 
From eq.(4.12) counter-intuitive non-Keynesian effects will result if the following inequality holds: 
 
γ−
= <
+
1
2 1
1
0
1
cdY
dD n
                                                                                                            (4.13) 
 
that is, if: 
1
1
c
γ >                                                                                                                                     (4.14) 
We recall that γ  is a parameter that links permanent public deficit to permanent income. If 1 1c = , 
inequality holds if 1γ > , that is if a permanent income variation involves belief of a greater 
permanent income variation. If 1 1c < , inequality becomes much more doubtful. 
Recalling that the  equilibrium income is: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 2
1 0
1 11 1 1
1 11
n n n nY D n D D D n D c D
k k
Bc A n
k k
βα ξ βα ξ γ ϑ
ϑ βν α ξ
− − − − = − − + − − + − + 
+ − − +      
                    (4.15) 
A detailed list of fiscal multipliers with different relevant assumptions on parameter values is 
included in Appendix II. Now, deriving eq.(4.15) for D1 and D2, we obtain the total effect on income 
of public deficit, 1D  and 2D : 
β α ξ β α ξ γ θ− −− + − + −
+ = + +
1 1
0 1 0 2 1
1 2
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1)n nn n D n n D cdY dY
dD dD k k k
              (4.16) 
 
If consumption is totally dependent on permanent income, that is if ϑ = 0 , the total effect is equal 
to: 
 
 
β α ξ β α ξ γ− −− + − +
+ = + −
1 1
0 1 0 2 1
1 2
1 ( ) 1 ( )
' ' '
n nn n D n n D cdY dY
dD dD k k k
                          (4.17) 
 
where: 
αδ ξδ= + + +1 0
1 1
' 1k n n
                                                                                                   (4.18) 
 
is a smaller multiplier than that of eq.(4.10), due to the absence of 0c . 
If we assume a simple linear relation between public deficit and inflation expectations, with the 
exponent of 1
nD  and 2
nD  equal to unity, the effect of deficit spending on income becomes 
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β α ξ β α ξ γ θ− + − + −
+ = + +0 0 1
1 2
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1)n n cdY dY
dD dD k k k
                                   (4.19) 
 
Hence: 
 
+ <
1 2
0
dY dY
dD dD
                                                                                                                  (4.20) 
 
if 
 
{ }β α ξ θ γ− + − −   0 12 1 ( ) (1 ) 0n c  
 
or if  
 
β α ξ θ γ+ + −≺ 0 12 2 ( ) (1 )n c                                                                                       (4.21) 
 
 
 
Finally, inequality (4.21) holds greater is the value of the CBRF on monetary market, β , and on 
exchange market, ξ , the non-Keynesian component of consumption, 1(1 )c ϑ− , the “super-
Ricardian” effect, γ . 
If we relax the previous assumption of linearity between public deficit and inflation expectations, 
and we suppose non-linearity and asymmetry in the effects of the public deficit on inflation 
expectations, public deficit will switch in cubic functions, 3 31 2and DD . 
Now: 
 
β α ξ β α ξ γ θ− + − + −
+ = + +
2 2
0 1 0 2 1
1 2
1 3 ( ) 1 3 ( ) ( 1)n D n D cdY dY
dD dD k k k
                  (4.22) 
 
Recalling the key role of CBRF, and with: 
 
0( )n RFβ α ξ+ =  
 
+ <
1 2
0
dY dY
dD dD
                                                                                                                 (4.23) 
 
if 
 
β β θ γ− + − − − <2 21 2 11 3 ( ) 1 3 ( ) (1 ) 0RF D RF D c  
 
or if: 
 
β θ γ + + −  2 21 2 12 2 (3 ( )( ) (1 )RF D D c                                                                   (4.24) 
Asymmetrical effects of public deficit on inflation expectations increase the probability of fiscal 
consolidation success,  but it is worth mentioning that in such a case non-linearity increases the 
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probability of inequality as fiscal retrenchment is helped by an easing of monetary policy which 
increases investment and net export. However, this is not a case of pure fiscal policy.  
 
 
6. An Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section we explore the existence of a relationship between interest rate setting and a set of 
explanatory variables like inflation expectations, deficits, output gap, and other macroeconomic 
factors that could affect monetary policy decisions. Our approach to modelling inflation expectations 
and monetary policy follows the idea, introduced by Ball (2000), of the so-called “nearly rational” 
approach. It assumes that, in forming expectations (of any variable), economic agents optimally use 
all information in the past values of such a variable. That is, we assume that expectations are based 
on optimal univariate forecasts. This "near rational" approach to expectations can explain why 
inflation appears so sluggish in the past two decades. 
First, we consider the basic relationship between interest rate setting and inflation expectations with 
a standard OLS methodology. Second, we use a Kalman filter approach in order to observe how the 
coefficients of each variable of the model have changed over time. Finally we shift our analysis to the 
study of linear-nonlinear relationships of an augmented Taylor rule where we test the assumptions 
made in the theoretical model of non-linear reactions of the Central Bank to deficit. Using monetary 
policy reaction functions, this section examines whether monetary policy responds to deficit in two 
central banks, namely, the ECB and FED. 
 
 
6.1 Data Analysis 
 
The choice of the 1999-2006 sample for the ECB and FED, using monthly observations, was 
essentially based on the need to analyse the behaviour of both monetary authorities after the launch 
of the Euro currency. We describe, in appendix III, the variables that will be used in our empirical 
analysis.  
  
 
 
6.2 Preliminary Evidence 
 
The first step in the analysis requires us to test the relationship between a CBRF to inflation 
expectations. The assumption underlying this relationship is using HCS (Harmonised Consumer 
Survey) and MSCI (Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index) variables as indicators of inflation 
expectations. We postulate that they are positively correlated with the interest rate set by central 
banks. We think there is a strong influence of inflation expectations on interest rate setting. 
Therefore, inflation expectations dynamic is crucial in determining monetary authority co-operative 
behaviour in the case of fiscal consolidation. We use, for the ECB and FED, respectively, the 
Repurchase Rate and the Federal Funds Rate.  
Figures 1 and 2 present the patterns of the most representative economic variables and their trends in 
order to explain the different behaviours of the two Central Banks. The figures give preliminary 
evidence that there is a relationship between the interest rate and inflation expectations. Moreover, 
they show that there seems to be a relationship between deficit and inflation expectations for the 
ECB, while for the FED such a relationship does not seem to exist. Thus, this raw data analysis 
suggests the need for in-depth investigation of the relationship between the interest rate and inflation 
expectations and its determinants.  
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Figure 1 EU Macroeconomic Variables and their Trends 
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Figure 2 US Macroeconomic Variables and their Trends 
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Therefore, we start our empirical analysis applying an OLS estimation with several lags of the 
dependent variable. However, it is well established that, due to the correlation of the lagged 
dependent variable to the transformed error term, standard fixed effects estimators of models with 
lagged dependent variables result in biased and inconsistent estimates unless the number of time 
periods is large (see Ridder & Wansbeek 1990, and Kiviet 1993). In this model, T = 92, hence the 
bias is negligible. 
We assume that the central bank cooperative attitude will depend on inflation expectation dynamics 
in the following way: 
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1
,           (6.2.1a) 
 
or  
 
( ) t
nt
n
i
e
ijtR εππβα +−+=
−
=
∑
1
,        (6.2.1b) 
 
The results of the estimations of equations (6.2.1a) and (6.2.1b) for ECB and FED are presented in 
tables 1 and 2. The best measure is given by the relation between overnight rate and inflation gap, a 
quarter lagged. 
 
 
Tab. 1 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK INTEREST RATE REACTION TO INFLATION 
EXPECTATIONS 
 REPURCHASE RATE OVERNIGHT RATE 
  R_squared  R_squared 
e
tπ  0.078 
(11.939) 
0.618 0.077 
(12.293) 
0.61 
1
e
tπ −  0.079 
(12.208) 
0.629 0.078 
(11.59) 
0.61 
     
( )e
t
π π−  1.103 
(7.715) 
0.403 1.092 
(7.473) 
0.383 
( )
4
e
t
π π
−
−  1.347 
(8.549) 
0.601 1.347 
(10.825) 
0.577 
Source: ECB and European Commission 
 
 
Tab. 2 FED INTEREST RATE REACTION TO INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 
 FED DISCOUNT RATE FED FUND RATE 
  R_squared  R_squared 
e
tπ  0.078 
(4.554) 
0.20 0.11 
(6.492) 
0.30 
1
e
tπ −  0.081 
(4.509) 
0.20 0.118 
(6.545) 
0.32 
     
( )e
t
π π−  2.53 
(7.164) 
0.30 1.782 
(4.396) 
0.11 
( )
4
e
t
π π
−
−  2.49 
(6.808) 
0.25 1.826 
(4.541) 
0.11 
Source: FED and University of Michigan 
 
 
6.3 Kalman Filter Methodology 
 
We then proceed to identify the coefficient of inflation expectations in eq. (6.2.1a) and (6.2.1b) in a 
more sophisticated way. In order to recover the parameter dynamics over time, we estimate eq. 
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(6.2.1) employing the Kalman filter algorithm. Our second step concerns the selection of the best 
lagged variables using time-varying coefficients methodology. Generally, the choice of explanatory 
variables depends on their statistical significance in the model. 
The Kalman Filter is a popular method which can be used to estimate unobserved variables, provided 
they appear as explanatory variables in a model that can be written in a “state space form”. Hence, 
the system must be written in a state space form with a measurement equation in a matrix format:  
 
ttt XZy γ+= .  with  ),0(~ HNtγ                                    (6.3.1a) 
 
where yt is the value of the output gap, while Xt is a matrix of dimension (Txk) which includes all the 
explanatory variables plus a constant; the state vector Z, a (kx1) vector that contains all the slope 
coefficients, which are now varying through time and γt represents residuals with 
variance/covariance matrix H. The transition equation in a matrix format:  
 
ttt vZTZ += −1.                                                                                             (6.3.1b)   
     
where vt ~ N (0,Q), and T is a vector of parameters. Such a model may be estimated by means of a 
Kalman filter.  
In principle, with this method all the model parameters may be estimated. In practice, there might be 
a trade-off between the number of parameters being estimated and the convergence of the likelihood 
function. More specifically, a key variable to the estimation of such models is the relative 
smoothness of the unobserved variable, which is governed by the relative size of the error variances 
in (6.3.1a) and (6.3.1b). The higher the ratio of the variance of the transition to the measurement 
equation residuals, referred to as the “signal-to-noise ratio” (Q/H), the more explanatory power is 
given to the unobserved variable, and the better the fit of the measurement equation. In the limit, for 
very large values of Q, the unobserved variable may soak up all the residual variation in the 
measurement equation. Alternatively if Q is zero, then it will be estimated as a constant.  
In practice, most studies fix the signal-to-noise ratio so that the estimated unobserved variable is 
relatively smooth, with fluctuations which are judged to be reasonable from one period to another, 
which Gordon (1997) qualifies as “the [unobserved variable] can move around as much as it likes, 
subject to the qualification that sharp quarter-to-quarter zigzags are ruled out” 21. 
Time-Varying Methodology allows us to recover an unobservable factor that could affect the repo 
rate.  
We then apply a time-varying parameter model as follows: 
 
itnitnitnitititititit bbbR γπππα +++++= −−−− ,2211 ....                                 (6.3.2)   
 
where i is the country, γit is an independent white noise and the coefficients are assumed to be 
random walks. This can be written in state space form where the observation equation is given by (3) 
above and the state equations are given by: 
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    21 See Bank of England (1998) for a survey. Some exceptions are Apel and Jansson (1998, 1999) for Sweden, Kichian (1999)  for 
Canada. These are country-specific studies, using quite sophisticated models. 
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The model in equations (6.3.2) and (6.3.3) was initially estimated by maximum likelihood and the 
estimated variances are presented in table 3. Since we consider the time variation in parameters very 
important and its implication in defining a more reliable monetary policy, we need to test five 
hypotheses regarding the constancies of all or part of the parameters in eq. (6.3.3). Accordingly, we 
test five hypotheses: 
 
1. 0:
2
3
2
2
2
1
21
0 ==== νννν σσσσH  which implies that all parameters in eq. 3 are constant; 
2. 0: 220 =νσH  which implies a constant intercept but time variation in the persistence 
parameters; 
3. 0: 21
3
0 =νσH  which implies a time-varying intercept but a constant inflation expectations 
parameter with one lag. 
4. 0: 22
4
0 =νσH  which implies a time-varying intercept but a constant inflation expectations 
parameter with two lags. 
5. 0: 250 =nH νσ  which implies a time-varying intercept but a constant inflation expectations 
parameter with “n” lags. 
In order to test these hypotheses, we estimate the restricted versions of the model.  
The maximum number of lags used is n=5; the hypotheses in 1), 2), 3), 4) and 5) can be tested using 
the likelihood ratio test (LR test). These test statistics follow a χ2 distribution with R degrees of 
freedom under the null hypothesis22. The results from these five tests are given in table 4. 
 
 
 
Table 4 Variance of the parameters from Kalman filter of equations (3) and (4). 
Variance   USA EUM
σ2ν 3.958x10
-7
 6.875x10-6
σ2ν1 3.857x10
-6 4.269x10-7
σ2ν2 3.098x10
-6 7.546x10-6
σ2ν3 8.153x10
-6 6.172x10-7
σ2ν4 4.589x10
-7 5.771x10-7
σ2µ 3.547x10
-5 5.334x10-6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 A likelihood ratio test is calculated as the ratio of the likelihood of the sample data at the hypothesised value of β to the maximum 
of the likelihood function (i.e. evaluated at the MLE). Hence we calculate (for H0: β = β0 vs ≠0) 
LR = λ = L(β0)/L(βML) with λ < 1. If it is near to 1 we accept H0, if not we reject it. We now need the distribution of λ. In some 
simple problems this can be worked out, but usually not. Fortunately it can be shown that -2 ln λ ~ χ2 in large samples, with q 
degrees of freedom where q is the number of restrictions in H0.  Now, large values of the test statistic (minus twice the log-likelihood 
ratio) reject H0.   
 20
 
Tab. 4 Likelihood Ratio Test (LR test) 
  USA EUM 
0: 23
2
2
2
1
21
0 ==== νννν σσσσH  )4(
2
LRχ
♦ 524.65** 451.77** 
0: 220 =νσH  )1(
2
LRχ  623.69** 479.54** 
0: 21
3
0 =νσH  )1(
2
LRχ  598.71** 396.98** 
0: 22
4
0 =νσH  )1(
2
LRχ  608.26** 413.36** 
0: 23
5
0 =νσH  )1(
2
LRχ  588.45** 389.58** 
0: 24
6
0 =νσH  )1(
2
LRχ  651.94** 405.86** 
Sample  1999:01/2006:10 1999:01/2006:10 
♦ )(2 RLRχ  are the test statistics from the likelihood ratio tests of whether the variances in the 
equations for the parameters of the model are zero. ** significant at the 1% level;  
 
First, it can be noted that 0: 23
2
2
2
1
21
0 ==== νννν σσσσH  is forcefully rejected for all countries and 
we conclude that some kinds of time-variation in coefficients seem to be important. The tests also 
confirm that the constant intercepts for all countries are time-varying. Rejecting 0:30H , 0:40H , 0:50H  
and 0:60H  it connotes that 1
e
tπ − , 
e
t 2−π , 
e
t 3−π  and 
e
t 4−π  are not constant.  
In conclusion, null hypotheses are rejected for both countries and for all tests. Based on the above 
results, we conclude that the unrestricted models in equations (6.3.2)  and (6.3.3) are preferred and 
we do not need to impose any restriction on them. 
Once we have estimated the dynamic coefficients of the unrestricted model in eq. (6.3.3), we see the 
contribution of each inflation expectation (n) at time t in our interest rate setting as presented in table 
5 and in figures 8-9 . 
In equation (6.3.2), the coefficient 'b', estimated using the Kalman Filter approach against interest rates 
(EU Repurchase rate and US FED Fund rate), permits us to evaluate the evolution of ECB and FED 
responsiveness to inflation expectations. The empirical results are summarized in table 5.      
Tab. 5  The Kalman Transition Equation 1999-2006 
ECB Constant INFLEX (-4) 
Coefficient 
z-Statistict 
 
-0.215 
(-0.4562) 
1.0971** 
(5.212) 
FED Constant INFLEX (-1) 
Coefficient 
z-Statistic 
 
-4.981** 
 
(-4.863) 
0.7128** 
(4.304) 
* significant at the 0.05 level; **  significant at the 0.01 level 
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The maximum likelihood estimates show that the parameters of the time-varying coefficients “b” are 
positive, as predicted by the model, and highly significant for both countries. Figure 3 shows the 
behaviour of the coefficient 'bt', for the sample, February 1999 to December 2006. 
More precisely, as suggested by the analysis, evolution of ECB and FED responsiveness to inflation 
expectations reflects the behaviour postulated in the theoretical model and shown in figure 4. Observing  
ECB behaviour, it increased steadily at the beginning of the sample and remained high till the end of 
2004 when it inverted the trend, implying a tight monetary policy (high interest rate responses to high 
inflation expectations). The Federal Reserve increased the value of its instrumental variable till the end 
of 2001 when it noticeably inverted its trend, implying more “output-oriented” monetary policy (low 
interest rate responses to high inflation expectations). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Kalman Filter’s Coefficients and Trends 
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Fig. 4 EURO RED PARR and US Deficit and “b” Trends 
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Figure 4 suggests that our model intuition of a non-linear relationship between inflation expectations 
and deficit could be indirectly confirmed by Kalman Filter analysis. Thus, it seems that a non-linear 
test for this relation and its analysis is needed.  
 
 
 
Non-linear Analysis  
 
The Smooth Transition Regression Model 
 
In order to explain and analyze the non-linear policy behaviour of a central bank, a non-linear time 
series model is required. In this work we apply the smooth transition regression (STR) model. 
Despite the Markov-switching model, this method allows the regression coefficients to change 
smoothly from one regime to another. Moreover, in the STR model, the switching from one regime 
to another is endogenous, and gives opportunity for an economic explanation of the non-linear 
behaviour.  
 
The STR model is defined as follows 
 
( , , )t t t t tr z z G c s uφ θ γ′ ′= + +                                                                                               (6.4.1)              
 
and 
 
( ){ } 1( , , ) (1 exp )t tG c s s cγ γ −= + − −                                                                                   (6.4.2)  
 
Zt is a vector of explanatory variables. G(γ,c,st) is the transition function. G(γ,c,st) ∈  [0;1], and it is 
continuous in the threshold/transition variable st . st  is not necessarily contained in Zt. c is the 
threshold around which the regimes are defined. γ is the slope parameter that determines the 
smoothness of the transition between regimes. 
It is possible to assume that non-linearities in the Taylor rule equation can be described adequately 
by a Logistic or an Exponential Smooth Transition model (LSTR and ESTR respectively)23. 
However, in this paper we define G(γ,c,st) as a first-order logistic function so that the STR model 
becomes a logistic smooth transition model (LSTR).  
Defining st as the deficit (dt), the LSTR specification implies that the coefficient on deficit would 
take different values depending on whether the deficit is below or above the threshold value “c”. 
This would mean that whenever the deficit is beyond a particular level, the reaction of the monetary 
authority becomes more aggressive, leading to a larger response of interest rates when the deficit 
increases. On the other hand, when the deficit is below the threshold “c”, the monetary authority 
reaction is milder.  
In the case of the ESTR model, the coefficient changes depending on whether the deficit is close or 
far away from the threshold “c”, regardless of whether this difference is positive or negative. In this 
case the reaction of the monetary authority would be equally aggressive for negative or positive 
deviations from the threshold.  
Given the above two specifications, we decide to apply LSTR methodology because it fits well with 
the idea that a reasonable asymmetric reaction of central bank should take into account the sign of 
the deviation from the threshold value. Hence, the more the deficit is above the threshold, the 
stronger the central bank reaction should be. On the contrary, the further below the threshold the 
deficit is, the less aggressive the monetary authority reaction should be.  
                                                 
23 See Granger and Terasvirta, 1993. 
 23
Equations (6.4.1) and (6.4.2) can be rewritten as a linear regression model with time-varying 
coefficients. Hence, rewriting equation (6.4.1) as 
 
t t tr z uδ ′= +                                                                                                                        (6.4.3) 
 
where  
 
( , , )j j j tG c sδ φ θ γ= +                                                                                                         (6.4.4) 
 
then ,j j j jδ φ φ θ ∈ +   and it changes monotonically with the deficit. When γ = 0 the logistic function 
is equal to 0.5 and the model is linear. When  γ →∞ the LSTR approaches a threshold model with 
two regimes. 
 
 
Linearity Test 
 
In order to test for linearity we should test the hypothesis that γ = 0 in the non-linear model. 
Unfortunately, our model is not defined under the null. This problem can be avoided by 
approximating the transition function with a third-order Taylor-series expansion around the null 
hypothesis γ = 0, see Tarasvirta (1998). After the approximation, using the deficit as the threshold 
variable, the following auxiliary regression is obtained 
 
3
*
00 01 02 1 2
1
( ) jt t t j t j t t t
j
r d y d y d uα α α α α
=
= + + + + +∑                                                              (6.4.5) 
 
Hence, the linearity test can be carried out with 
 
11 12 21 22 31 32: 0Ho α α α α α α= = = = = =  
 
The results of the linearity test on equations for the FED and ECB are reported in table 5. 
 
Tab. 5 P-VALUES FOR THE LINEARITY TEST. 
  ECB FED 
H0: Linearity Model 0.0260 0.1151 
 
Hence, an important result that can be drawn from this preliminary linearity test is that a linear model 
could be used to describe the FED behaviour, while a non-linear model should be the most 
appropriate one for the ECB in the observed period (1999-2006). 
 
 
The LSTR Model Estimation 
 
The LSTR model has been used to estimate the Taylor rule, as specified in the previous sections. In 
order to do so, the deficit is chosen as the threshold variable. Thus, the LSTR model takes the 
following form 
 
0 1 2 0 1 2( ) ( , , )t t t t t t tr d y d y G c d uφ φ φ θ θ θ γ= + + + + + +                                                         (6.4.6) 
 
and 
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( ){ } 1( , , ) (1 exp )t tG c d d cγ γ −= + − −                                                                                  (6.4.7) 
 
where rt is the interest rate, dt is the deficit and yt is the output gap. 
Table 6 shows that the γ parameter of the FED is close to zero, evidencing a very smooth transition. 
The deficit threshold for a reaction is estimated to be 4.76895. These conclusions are consistent with 
the results found in the linearity test (Table 5). In table 7 we calculate several levels of G 
corresponding to different levels of deficit. The calculated FED response shows that the reaction is 
extremely smooth since it ranges from 2.6 to 2.7. 
 
Tab. 6 LSTR MODEL FOR THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
PARAMETER 0φ  2φ  1θ  Γ C 
      
Estimate 6.0524    5.09716  4.3359   0.01019 4.76895   
Standard error 7.8015    0.82455   0.05213 0.00481 2.73345 
P-Value 0.44 0.000 0.000 0.037 0.084 
Sample period 1999-2006  
R2 0.52 
Error Variance^(1/2) = 1.17352 
 
  
Table 7 THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S RESPONSE TO DEFICIT 
DEFICIT 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 
         
G(γ,c,dt) 0.499315 0.49957 0.499824 0.500079 0.500334 0.500589 0.500843 0.501098 
Fed 
response 
2.164979 2.166084 2.167188 2.168293 2.169398 2.170502 2.171607 2.172711 
The Federal Reserve’s response: 4.3359*G  
 
 
Tab. 8  LSTR MODEL FOR THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK. 
PARAMETER 0φ  2φ  1θ  Γ C 
      
Estimate 2.29556  0.77323   2.40118 15.2458 3.60975   
Standard error 0.2955  0.19855 0.19853 0.11575 1.04585    
P-value 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005 
Sample period 1999-2006  
R2 0.67  
Error Variance^(1/2)= 1.18688 
 
 
Tab. 9 THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK’S RESPONSE TO DEFICIT  
DEFICIT 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 
         
G(γ,c,dt) 0.008816 0.039248 0.157994 0.462907 0.798337 0.947872 0.988169 0.9974 
ECB 
response 
0.021168 0.094242 0.379373 1.111522 1.916951 2.276011 2.372771 2.394937 
The European Central Bank’s response: 2.40118 *G  
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Tables 8 and 9 illustrate the results for the ECB using the same method. The γ parameter is higher, 
thus the transition for the European Central Bank is less smooth around the threshold value. It is 
worth noting that a) the threshold for the reaction is 3.60975; b) the ECB reaction threshold is very 
close to that fixed by the stability pact (3.00); c) these results are consistent with those of the 
linearity test output above (table 5) since the reaction of the ECB shows an asymmetric response. 
Moreover, we can conclude that the ECB reaction is more asymmetric than the FED one; and d) the 
ECB reaction increases sharply when the deficit is above the threshold value.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
NKV success in mainstream economics can be initially ascribed to the climate of progressive 
criticism which, in the early 1990s, regarded expansionary fiscal policies as a means to achieve full 
employment. Such criticism based its rationale on the wave of immense disbelief in Keynesian tools, 
as testified by the crowding-out debate, the trigger of financial instability due to growing stocks of 
public debts and the Ricardian equivalence approach to policy making. 
Complete scepticism of NKV for  fine-tuning target of public deficit is the last addendum to a decade 
of attacks on Keynesian effects of “pure fiscal policies”. 
The intent to build an alternative standpoint was considered so appealing as to make its advocates 
blind to the true causes of the success of some isolated experience of expansionary fiscal 
retrenchments: success was due to a policy mix that Keynesian experience, particularly in the United 
States in the early 1980s, had already examined, arguing the advantages of a mix of restrictive fiscal 
policies and easing monetary policies. Therefore, NKV success is much more the result of 
“consolidated results” of co-operative economic policies than an “unconventional wisdom”. 
The intent of our paper was to analytically prove that increase (decrease) in consumption and 
decrease (increase) in inflation expectations cannot result from pure fiscal retrenchments 
(expansions): in other words, to refute the existence of a “super-Barro” effect and underline the 
crucial role of a monetary stance in accompanying fiscal policy. It seems, in our opinion, too weak a 
manifesto for a revolution in theory and policy-making. Nothing new has happened except an over-
statement of the “Barro Effect” on consumption. 
The European Central bank, much more than the Federal Reserve, was immediately willing to accept 
the NKV theoretical background (De Grauwe, 2002), because it seemed good theoretical 
underpinning for fiscal retrenchments and public sector shrinking. The label attached to these 
agreement is the most evident belief in “Keynesian effects of non-Keynesian fiscal policies”. This 
could help understand why the NKV, despite its unequivocal limits, became the new conventional 
wisdom in Europe. It would be wise today not only to see their shortcomings but also recall that 
“new” policies come from far away and that their outcomes depend on many surrounding, exogenous 
conditions. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
CBRF is micro-founded through the CB LOSS FUNCTION 
 
Money market equilibrium can be expressed in the following form: 
m ky hR π= − +  
where m is the demand for bank reserves - (M3) expressed in terms of growth rate – which is a positive 
function of income growth ky and inflation π and a negative function of the rate of interest hR . 
The loss function of the Central Bank is obviously linked to the growth rate of money: 
( )L L m=  
or  
( , , )L L y R π=  
Writing the loss-function in an explicit and very simple form we have: 
( )21
2i i i i
L ky hRπ= + −∑  
The Central Bank looks for the rate of interest - the instrument – which minimizes the loss-function or the 
m rate of growth. Because m depends on y  and π , it is a maximization problem subject to the constraint:  
( )ei i
e
i i i
y R
sub
y
ρ π
π σ π
 = − −

= +
 
where the first equation is an IS curve and the second is a supply curve AS. 
Substituting the IS constraint in AS, we have: 
(1 ) ei iRπ σρ σρ π= − + +  
Considering - for the sake of simplicity - just one period of time and substituting the constraint in the loss-
function we have the following Taylor rule: 
1 e
t t
kR y
h h
σρ
π
σρ σρ
+
= +
+ +
 
which is the monetary policy rule curve (MP curve) allowing aggregate demand to be found. In turn, the 
aggregate demand curve combined with the AS curve determines the equilibrium income. 
Finally, indicating: 
1
h
σρβ
σρ
+
=
+
 
and 
k
hσρ
∂ =
+
 
the Taylor rule then becomes : 
e
t tR yβπ δ= +  
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Appendix II 
 
Taxonomy of deficit increase effects 
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APPENDIX III 
Data Description 
 For the estimation of the equations used in this work, the variables considered were24: 
a) Repo rate: this is the central bank interest rate also called official interest rate. It is the main instrument of 
monetary policy to maintain price stability. The Federal Reserve Discount Rate is the rate at which 
member banks may borrow short term funds directly from a Federal Reserve Bank. The discount rate is 
one of the two interest rates set by the Fed, the other being the Federal funds rate; 
b) Overnight rate:  defined as the rate that constitutes the very starting point of the yield curve and is 
normally perceived as being within the control of the central bank, it is thus also important to understand 
its dynamics. For the ECB it is called EONIA and it is an average, calculated on a daily basis, of the 
(lending) turnover in the unsecured overnight market of the 49 panel banks. For the FED the federal funds 
rate (FEDON hereafter) is the interest rate at which depository institutions lend balances (federal funds) at 
the Federal Reserve to other depository institutions overnight. These variables are from the European 
Central Bank and Federal Bank of St. Louis. 
c) Harmonised Consumer Survey (HCS): it is the proxy of inflation expectations used for Europe. The 
European Commission’s monthly HCS is conducted every month across the European Union as part of 
the joint harmonised EU program of business and consumer surveys. The consumer survey was initiated 
in May 1972, and is now carried out in all 25 current members (Aren’t there now 27 members???) of the 
EU. The survey is conducted on behalf of the European Commission by various national survey 
organizations. The sample size in each of the 15 countries that were members of the EU prior to the most 
recent expansion ranges between 1,000 and 3,300 consumers. The survey asks a standard set of questions 
in all countries, and the results are reported each month by the European Commission, and used as inputs 
to the monthly economic and consumer sentiment indexes (M. A. Wynne, 2005). The proxy of the 
inflation expectations used for the United States is the MCSI, conducted by the University of Michigan, 
which is a valuable guide to changes in consumer attitudes that may influence spending behaviour. The 
preliminary data are released on the tenth (except on weekends) of each month. A final report for the prior 
month is released on the first of the month. 
d) Industrial production: due to the need to use monthly observations, industrial production is taken as proxy 
of GDP. The Index of Industrial Production shows the movement of the volume of output of the Industrial 
Sector. It is one of the most important industrial short-term indicators which aims to measure, on a 
monthly basis, the ups and downs of the volume of industrial output with a special focus on detecting, as 
early as possible, the turning points of the business cycle. This enables planners, decision makers and the 
business community at large to be aware of any sign of change in the progress of the economy in order to 
take appropriate and timely policy measures. Both indexes are from the IMF- Financial statistics.  
a) Output gap (yt): it is the percentage deviation of monthly industrial production from the long-run trend 
computed with the Hodrick-Prescott filter; 
b) The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to calculate effective inflation (πt), that is πt is equal to 
100*[ln(CPIt/CPIt-12)];  
c) US Deficit: it is general government deficit (-) or surplus (+), expressed as percentage points, 
series(t)/GDP(t). The EU Deficit is defined similarly as Euro area 12 (fixed composition), General 
government Deficit (change in aggregated debt), expressed as percentage points, series(t)/GDP(t); 
Finally, the variable DM3 is the contribution to the M3 annual growth rate by central government25 borrowing 
from Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFIs). “The relationship between MFI credit to general 
government and M3 can be illustrated in the context of the consolidated MFI balance sheet. An increase in the 
credit extended to general government by MFIs (either in the form of loans or as purchases of government 
debt securities) will expand the asset side of the MFI balance sheet. All other things being equal, the 
accounting identity underlying the balance sheet implies that either another item on the asset side must shrink 
or the liabilities side of the MFI balance sheet must also expand, for instance, through an increase in M3 
(which represents the largest component of MFI liabilities)”26. 
                                                 
24 Data source: IMF - Financial Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank, European Central Bank, University of Michigan and 
European Commission. 
25 Balance Sheet Items; Frequency: Monthly; Reference area: Euro area (changing composition); Adjustment indicator: Working day 
and seasonally adjusted; BS reference sector breakdown: Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFIs); type: Contribution to the 
annual growth rate of M3; Counterpart area: Euro area (changing composition); BS counterpart sector: Central Government deficit. 
26 ECB Monthly Bulletin, April 2004, page 45. 
